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In the recent decades, in the context of globalization and increasing international 
competition, national governments pay more and more attention to fostering innovation in order 
to compensate for market failures, system failures, and failures in the ability to absorb new 
knowledge. There is a wide range of innovation-supporting instruments: tax incentives, public 
funding, institutes for development, etc. However, the issues of efficiency and advisability of 
different support policies are crucial, especially in the situation of budget constraints. It is 
necessary to choose innovation support policies that would be efficient enough while not 
tangibly distorting the market environment.  
Progress in learning new innovation support mechanisms and their application in Russian 
innovation policy has become apparent in the last few years
1
. Nevertheless, experience both 
positive and negative experience of earlier-introduced support policies application is largely 
neglected when new policies are being designed. Moreover, expert discussions of improving 
public spending efficiency and development of the Russian tax system have demonstrated that 
the debate of the pros and contras of different approaches to innovation still brews in Russia, 
even at a very high level of generalization, e. g., when comparing tax and financial incentives.   
For all its multidirectionality, the innovation policy realized by the state still lacks one 
necessary attribute: regular independent progress evaluation. Although there is a general practice 
of macroeconomic evaluation of budget losses and short term benefits from the use of innovation 
support policies, there is no integrated system of analyzing the impact of different support 
mechanisms on innovation development at the micro level, such as change in companies' 
behavior, shifts in preferences of major stakeholders, developments in cooperation with research 
institutions, and increasing learning capacity. 
In this context, the main objective of our paper is a micro-level study of how support 
mechanisms impact companies' innovative behavior. We also evaluate effectiveness of tax and 
direct tools to support innovation and compare positive and negative effects of these policies' 
application.  
 
 
1. The research agenda: main questions and hypotheses for empirical 
testing  
The general agenda of the study is determined by the sequence of six questions:  
(1) To which extent increase in firms' productivity is connected to their innovation 
activity?  
                                                          
1 See (Simachev, Kusyk, 2013) for detailed analysis of state innovation support policies. 
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(2) How does state support of innovation impact the quality of firms' innovation 
activity? 
(3) What companies receive state support for innovation more often? 
(4) How does the system of state-business relations affect allocation of state support? 
(5) What is the difference between how financial and tax incentives influence 
companies' innovation activity?   
(6) What accounts for the costs of companies' access to innovation support 
incentives? 
 
Regarding the above-mentioned questions, we have put down several propositions for 
further empirical testing: 
 
1) To what extent firms' productivity growth is related to their innovation 
activity? What are the basic parameters that determine increase in productivity?  
We initially assume that there is a general positive correlation between innovation activity 
of a firm and its increased competitiveness, in particular, the increase in its productivity. 
However, this recognition of innovation influence does not exclude the possibility that certain 
firms can find other ways to maintain their competitiveness, of which classical examples are: a 
firm's abuse of its market monopoly (Bogetic, Olusi, 2013), lobbying, receiving state support 
(not necessarily for innovation) by ineffective companies considering their social importance. 
Due to this circumstance, firms of significantly disparate productivity are allowed to exist in the 
same market for fairly long time. Extremely high heterogeneity of firms in terms of productivity, 
both within and between industries, has been highlighted in a study of the European Central 
Bank (Giannangeli, Gomez-Salvador, 2008). Such imbalances are also observed in the Russian 
economy, and lack of staff turnover is pointed to as a major impediment to equalizing 
productivity levels among enterprises (Bessonov et al., 2009) 
Since technological level of Russian companies is largely below the level of foreign 
competitors, borrowing technology through the acquisition of new equipment should prepare a 
significant jump in productivity growth (Mckinsey Global Institute, 2009). Imitational 
development involves lower risks, is characterized by significant training effects and often 
interpreted as a first step in the transition to innovation economy (Mukoyama, 2002). 
In principle, innovation provides other opportunities beside the productivity growth, e. g., 
cutting staff while intensifying labor; however, we supposed that companies were considerably 
limited in their ability to optimize the number of their employees, partly because of government 
pressures.    
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Proposition #1. The majority (most probably, the great majority) of companies who have 
recently increased their productivity are innovatively active. The increase in productivity is first 
of all determined by the firms' investment in new equipment.   
 
2) What is the role of state support in companies' ability to innovate? What 
indicators of companies' performance are significantly improved thanks to their use of 
state support?  
Many authors recognize the importance and effectiveness of state support of innovation 
(Goldberg, Gobbard, Racin, 2011; OECD, 2011). At the same time, they also point to problems 
and risks associated with state intervention. State support of innovation is important in terms of 
fostering change in companies' behavior, but there are quite significant lags in improving 
outcome indicators of innovative firms and their competitiveness (Lopez-Acevedo, Tan, 2010; 
Roper, Hewitt-Dundas, 2012; Shin, 2006). We suggested that, for a considerable number of 
companies, the risks of using state support are rather high. Costs associated with obtaining 
support, such as more frequent inspections and commitment to price regulation, have been 
confirmed empirically (Frye, 2002). These risks incite well-to-do companies to innovate without 
state support. 
Certainly, there are risks of rent-seeking behavior of companies receiving state support. 
We can expect that companies interested in getting rent will not be strongly motivated to make 
effective use of  acquired resources. Meanwhile, the state in the situation of asymmetrical 
information faces the difficulty to evaluate business efficiency and has to focus on more 
transparent and easily observed indicators, such as the volume of new products or export. Thus 
programs of direct public funding in New Zealand have had a positive effect on the dynamics of 
recipients' sales dynamics, but did not affect productivity and value added (Morris, Stevens, 
2010).  
Hypothesis #2. Significant number of companies innovate without state support while 
achieving great success in improving their performance (productivity and profitability). At the 
same time, state support of innovation stronger promotes improvement of output indicators in 
volume terms (amount of the revenue, volumes of new products and export). 
 
3) What companies receive state support for innovation more often? 
One of the most evident displays of 'state failures' in implementing its innovation policy 
is the state's excessive inclination to support big companies. The positive correlation between the 
scale of a business and the probability of its receiving state support has repeatedly been observed 
in empirical studies (Aschhoff, 2010; Fier, Heneric, 2005). 
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Increased share of large enterprises among recipients of state support witnesses about the 
reluctance of the state to risk (Garcia, Mohnen, 2010). It is clear that a small number of large 
recipients instead of a great number of small ones reduces transaction costs of funds allocation 
and simplifies control of their use. Besides, the proximity of big business to the state allows 
lobbying for additional financing.  
It is known that large enterprises innovate more often, so bias towards supporting big 
business ensures a pseudo-positive result necessary for reporting. At the same time, many 
empirical studies (see, for example, Lööf, Hesmati 2005; Wanzenbock, Scherngell, Manfred, 
2011) indicate that positive impact of external financing is significantly higher on small 
enterprises, since they make more efficient use of the funds, and their behavior is more sensitive 
to external financing.  
In Russia, the tendency to support big business has additional grounds, specifically, social 
ones: concentration of labor at large strategic enterprises compels the state to pay them more 
attention (Simachev, Kuzyk, Kuznetsov, 2010). Furthermore, the anti-crisis measures to reduce 
tensions in the labor market were continued after the main phase of the crisis had ended 
(Zubarevich 2010). 
Another possible distortion in the implementation of the state innovation policy is 
excessive support of partially state-owned companies. Interaction with such companies decreases 
uncertainty for decision-makers providing state support. Besides, public companies may have 
better skills of interaction with authorities.  
Hypothesis #3. Companies likely to receive state support of their innovation are: (1) big, 
(2) partially state-owned. 
 
4) How does the model of state-business relations influence allocation of innovation 
public funding? 
The system of business-state relations is the most important element of the national 
business climate, which in turn has a decisive influence on companies' innovative activity (RSPP, 
2011).  The nature of this influence is not so obvious. On the one hand, state intervention in 
economy significantly distorts parties' motivation. On the other, the necessity for the state to 
support generation of new knowledge, promote connections among different actors, develop 
coordination mechanisms, and create search network for the innovation are generally recognized.  
We suggest that the model of state-business relations can considerably influence 
allocation of state support. The traditionally strong integration between the state and business in 
post-Soviet Russia has transformed from the distinctive 1990s 'state capture' pattern to the 
'business capture' pattern (Yakovlev, 2005). In whatever direction the connection works, the very 
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fact of companies' receiving public support may give rise to their informal commitments before 
the state (Simachev, Kuzyk, 2012).  These commitments may limit companies' capacity to 
increase their efficiency and choose direction of their innovation, which in turn may reduce 
effectiveness of state support. We suppose that, due to the selective nature of state support, 
receiving direct public funding by companies will more often associate with the 'support in 
exchange for behavior' relationship pattern. 
Hypothesis #4. The pattern of business-state relationship is one of significant factors of 
companies' having (or lacking) state support of their innovation; in addition, (1) the less the 
government directly demands from business – the fewer the facts of state support are; (2) the 
model of direct exchange of commitments will more often be associated with receiving financial 
support by a business than the use of tax incentives.  
 
5) What are the features of tax and subsidies’ effect on companies' innovative 
behavior? What are the advantages and disadvantages of their use as part of the state 
innovation policy?  
Tax and financial innovation incentives vary significantly in their effect on business. 
Direct public funding measures suggest that sharing risks between business and the state reduce 
the degree of uncertainty. Direct funding may push a company to realize new projects. Equally 
important, reduced risks extend the planning horizon, resulting in initiated projects with a longer 
payback period that would not be implemented in the absence of public funding.   
Tax incentives, by contrast, primarily stimulate investment in already-launched projects 
(Guellec, Van Pottelsberghe, 2000; Jaumotte,  Pain, 2005). Redistribution of benefits in favor of 
ongoing projects serves to accelerate their completion or increase return on investment. Lastly, 
tax incentives may contribute to implementation of projects with lower rate of return (Köhler, 
Larédo, Rammer, 2012). 
Differences between the two groups of innovation incentives are not limited by the 
features of projects they support. The neutrality of direct funding measures to the characteristics 
of company tax structure and the possibility to grant targeted and selective support thus lowering 
the recipients' risks (see Berube, Mohnen, 2007) have at a reverse side of the coin the problem of 
supplanting private expenses by the public ones, or the crowding out effect.  
Companies-recipients of public financing may replace the funds they expected to spend 
on technological innovation by the funds received from the state and quasi-state organizations 
(Lach, 2002). The crowding out effect is also due to the fact that, in order to prove feasibility of 
funding programs, the state strives to demonstrate good performance indicators, resulting in 
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deliberately selecting successful projects that would have been implemented even without 
external involvement (David, Hall, Toole, 2000).  
Since tax incentives directly affect the marginal cost of research, the crowding out effect 
in the case of their use is far less pronounced, and public spending on tax policy eventually pays 
off by additional investments by businesses. For example, it has been noticed that a ten-percent 
reduction of R&D costs may in the long run lead to a growth of over 10% (Bloom et al., 2002). 
Hypothesis #5. Tax incentives and financial support have a different effect on companies' 
innovation: (1) financial incentives more than tax benefits reduce risks and contribute to the 
launch of new innovative projects; (2) at the same time, the problem of supplanting of private 
funds by the state ones is more typical for financial incentives. 
 
6) What are the costs of companies' access to innovation support mechanisms, and 
how do the main problems and application risks of financial and tax incentives relate to 
each other? 
To compare advantages and disadvantages of innovation support mechanisms, it is not 
only necessary to analyze their influence on companies' behavior but also to evaluate main 
problems (risks) associated with the use of these mechanisms. Contractors demand for the public 
support of innovation can be largely limited by deficient performance tuning and faulty design of 
these measures, as well as by unfriendly administration.  
Specific advantages of a support policy in its influence on business almost always entail 
high costs and objective difficulties of its administration. For example, one of the major utilities 
of tax incentives is expressed in the principle of 'neutrality,' when decision to support is taken 
automatically if applicant meets formal criteria known in advance (OECD, 2002), but it also 
increases the risks of benefits misuse.   
Another factor that is important to take into account when evaluating access to support 
mechanisms is the deterring effect. As it was earlier shown in the example of Spanish firms, 
many firms give up launching innovative activity because of overestimated expectations about 
upcoming challenges (D‟Este et al., 2012). In Russia, the problem of distortion of real problems 
is significant due to the underdevelopment of the civil society institutions and difficulties of 
obtaining independent expert evaluation. The effects of 'negativity,' when assessments of 
theoreticians are worse than those of practitioners, have already been described in Russian 
macroeconomic studies. For example, respondents poorly oriented in corporate regulation 
evaluated the quality of pertaining legislation lower than experts did, and respondents with no 
experience in dealing with judicial system more negatively assessed the practice of Russian 
arbitration courts (Golikova et al., 2003).  
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Hypothesis #6. Perception of problems and risks of use of innovation support mechanisms 
that is dominant in the business environment is more negative compared to the real situation. 
This trend is responsible for the significant deterring effect that discourages businesses to use 
support mechanisms. 
 
2. Methodological approach: initial data, features, and limitations 
This research is based on the microeconomic data obtained from surveys of companies' 
senior executives. The use of surveys for economic analysis has become fairly widespread in 
Russia. This approach has both its advantages and drawbacks, which we are not going to discuss 
in detail, since fortunately they have already been systematically examined (Dolgopyatova, 
2008). Suffice it to say that surveys provide significant opportunities to evaluate how diverse 
state policies affect behavior of economic agents (see, for example, (Gershman et al., 2004), 
(Zasimova et al., 2008), (Sushkevich, Avdasheva, Markin, 2013)).  
In this paper, we have focused on the advantages of using surveys of companies' senior 
management in order to reveal behavioral changes, motivations, and limitations of decision-
making at the enterprise level. We regard the possibility to assess characteristics of beneficiaries 
and effects of implementation of different state policies as especially valuable. 
The empirical base of the research is comprised of two formalized questionnaire polls of 
Russian industrial enterprises conducted in September-October 2011 and August-September 
2012
2
. In the first case, the sample consists of 602 companies, and of 652 in the second, while 
the panel includes 415 companies (Appendix Table 1). Sampling of enterprises was determined 
by quotas of companies representing manufacturing industries.   
The originality of this research is, as we see it, in the following: 
(1) comparing different phases in the dynamics of companies' innovation activity, while 
distinguishing the following enterprise groups: those with no innovations; those who started to 
innovate over the past three years; those whose innovations are being continued; those whose 
innovations have been ceased in the past three years. 
(2) more sophisticated analysis of change in competitive environment, compared to the 
typical 'insider/outsider' approach. In the past few years, partly due to intensive learning process, 
the differences in businesses' competition with domestic and foreign firms have gradually 
diminished. Thus the respondents were asked to evaluate the competition conditions in this 
                                                          
2 The surveys were conducted by request of the Interdepartmental Analytical Center by HSE ISSEK 
Center for Business Tendency Studies. 
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extended circle of economic agents: old Russian firms, new Russian firms, Russian divisions of 
foreign firms, and foreign firms.   
(3) analyzing the impact of innovation support mechanisms not only on output 
parameters, such as changing values of production and export and manufacturing new products, 
but also on changing companies' innovative behavior, choosing in-house innovation strategy (e. 
g., switching to the implementation of longer-term innovative projects, launching new projects, 
etc.);  
(4) comparing gains in the mechanisms of innovation state support with possible typical 
risks (e. g., the crowding out effect), analyzing problems of companies' access to support 
mechanisms and administration of their implementation.  
It is necessary to pay attention at some significant limitations of this research
3
. 
First. We have examined companies' technological innovation only. Let us note that in 
research on economically developed countries, innovations support policies are most often 
analyzed narrowly, concerning their encouraging companies' R&D spending. We have regarded 
not only R&D-related incentives but also mechanisms promoting investment in new equipment.  
Second. Certainly, comparing between two basic groups of policies, i.e., tax and 
subsidies, is a significant shortcut. However, even these generalized groups differ fundamentally 
by a number of criteria, e.g., universality or selectivity of choice, spending- or project-based 
approach, and indefinite or fixed duration of support.  
 
3. Results of empirical study 
3.1. Companies' productivity growth: innovation, imitation, or optimization? 
Growth of labor productivity is a good indicator of company's development and transition 
to more efficient production. However, there are different ways to increase productivity. It might 
be the active strategy of boosting business competitiveness via its modernization, shifting to 
advanced technologies, staff training and development.  Otherwise, it might be a passive, 
dilatory tactic associated mostly with cutting costs and intensification of labor.   
We have chosen the logarithm of worker efficiency as an indicator of labor productivity.  
Given the pronounced distinguishing features of each industry, we have differentiated three 
groups of enterprises within each industry by the level of productivity: low, medium, and high.  
We have thus received the opportunity to group sample enterprises by the relative measure of 
performance. Based on the panel data, we have selected a group of enterprises that in 2011 
                                                          
3 We will not discuss particularities of the evaluation of how policies influence companies' behavior: see, 
for example, methodological commentary in (Simachev, Kuzyk, 2012). 
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demonstrated higher values of relative efficiency compared to 2010 (the share of these 
enterprises in the sample is 42%). 
So how does the increase in productivity relate to company innovation? Our findings 
seemed unexpected to us (Table 2 of Appendix): among enterprises who demonstrated positive 
dynamics in their productivity, just every second one innovation! 
 At the core of the first – innovative – subgroup of enterprises with growing efficiency are 
successful young companies, exporting, and growing companies. Productivity growth of these 
companies is associated first of all with increase in turnover and increased investment in fixed 
assets.  Notably, a significant share of this innovative subgroup is comprised of enterprises who 
have recently started to innovate. A noticeable increase in these firms' productivity can be 
attributed to the beginners' effects of transition to the innovative development strategy. 
Regarding the second – non-innovative subgroup (which has also achieved increased 
productivity) – we could note that its representatives more often mentioned unfavorable financial 
situation, technological inadequacy, and lack of export. Companies of the non-innovative 
subgroup are characterized mostly by personnel cuts they have experienced.  
Regression analysis that we conducted (it included several specifications: see Table 3 of  
Appendix) showed that increase in productivity is observed mainly in the group of relatively 
small companies (with staff of up to 250 employees). We have confirmed our initial 
observations: innovative companies have been mostly focused on investment in fixed assets.   
Notably, the level of spending on innovation does not affect the variable in question. Companies 
that had nothing to do with innovation have increased their productivity first of all by way of 
cutting their staff.  
Obviously, if during the economic crisis companies' efforts to reduce their staff were 
actively checked by the government in order to maintain social stability, then certain easing of 
these restrictions after the crisis could further push companies to optimize their labor costs. In 
effect, this optimization became an available alternative to innovation on the way of maintaining 
business competitiveness.  
 
 3.2. State support of companies' innovation: is there a new quality? 
Impact of innovative practices on companies' efficiency has many channels, whereas 
labor productivity as such is not an indispensable positive effect of innovation. Let us look at the 
evaluations of innovation impact both as volume indicators (total output, production of new and 
improved products, and export) and indicators reflecting efficiency of companies' operation 
(labor productivity, profitability, power consumption, consumption of materials, and 
environmental compatibility) (Fig. 1). 
  11 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Improvement of companies' operation characteristics due to technological innovation in 
the past three years (frequency of responses of innovative companies' administrators) 
 
Most common effect of innovation is the increased output: both total and innovative one. 
Innovation markedly more rarely affects performance indicators: only in about a third of cases, 
technological innovation brings about an increase in productivity, and in a quarter – profitability 
improvement. Of course, we can assume that initially, different goals were set at the start of 
innovative projects, which resulted in higher prevalence of some effects compared to other. 
Be that as it may, the central question for us is not innovation particular effects, but what 
effects go more often with state support. In the analyzed sample, over a third of innovative firms 
are consumers of various instruments of state innovation support.  
In general, among state support recipient companies, the situation is almost always 
improved due to innovation, at least as reflected some output indicators.  This could be definitely 
attributed as well to the respondents' striving to report on the progress made; we suggest, 
however, that our use of subjective statistics and meeting anonymity requirements have largely 
reduced this risk of bias.  
To evaluate effects of state support on innovation outcomes more accurately, we have 
conducted a regression analysis that let us significantly limit the effects of company selection for 
state support and government preferences. Results of this simulation allow us (Table 4 of 
Appendix) to come to two basic conclusions: on the one hand, companies who have been 
receiving support in recent years are likely to demonstrate at least some positive change, in terms 
of the parameters under consideration; on the other, significant positive correlation with 
obtaining state support has been revealed only in two characteristics of company performance: 
export volume and energy efficiency. Our initial hypothesis that innovative companies improve 
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their efficiency better without state support has not been confirmed: availability (or absence) of 
state support by no means affects productivity growth.  
In general, the impact of state support for the majority of indicators considered is very 
weak, so we believe it is important to examine a more conspicuous influence of companies' own 
parameters and the quality of external environment on the effectiveness of innovation.  
First, growth of volume indicators affected by innovation is typical for relatively large 
companies (500-1000 employees), regardless of whether or not they have state support.   
Apparently, small Russian companies are not motivated to increase their scale: it is likely that for 
them, the increase is associated with significant risks and costs due to the insufficiently favorable 
business environment, which has been repeatedly noticed in many studies in Russia. 
Remarkably, companies demonstrating increase in total revenue following innovation are 
more often in optimal competitive conditions with foreign producers: among them, such 
competition is rarely non-existent or too strong; besides, companies are pushed to develop and 
extend output of new innovative products by stronger competition of old Russian firms.  
Secondly, positive dynamics of all indicators of resource efficiency – materials and 
energy consumption and labor productivity – are more common in large companies. Perhaps this 
is because these companies are more resource intensive, characterized by excessive employment, 
and the main subject of non-market influences, including informal ones by government officials.  
Third, improvement of energy efficiency and environmental friendliness is conventional 
for either relatively new companies or otherwise old enterprises created in the Soviet times.   For 
young companies, this relation can be determined by initially high susceptibility to advanced 
technological solutions, whereas for the 'Soviet' ones – by their severely outdated technologies 
and subsequently the low base effect. In fact, it is no coincidence that gain in energy efficiency 
due to innovation is standard for companies who have encountered increased competition of old 
Russian enterprises. As for the environmental friendliness, this result of innovation is noticeable 
in companies who have confronted growing competition of foreign firms, e. g., when exporting 
to distant foreign countries (not of the former Soviet Union, or FSU). 
Finally, growth of profitability and labor productivity are not yet, judging by our sample, 
a top-priority goal in companies' innovative practices. Companies start focusing on these goals 
when they have already lagged behind their competitors: it is usually companies with relatively 
low output level who experience improvement in these indicators. Interestingly, companies that 
are in the situation of less rigid competitive environment more often increase their profitability 
by means of innovation: probably because they have looser pricing opportunities, as well as 
firms with entirely private capital: we can suggest that in this case, business motivation to 
increase its cost effectiveness is less restrained.  
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In general, we can track different strategies of companies' innovation that are hardly 
influenced by state support and much stronger – by the companies' size, as well as the status quo 
and change in competition.   
 
3.3. What firms become recipients of innovation state support more often: the needy or the 
deserving ones? 
Interpretation of the innovation state support membership doesn't look like a trivial task 
at all. Indeed, what is better and righter, in terms of public objectives: to support a rather 
effective firm by additional resources and thus ensure the resources' efficient use, or allocate 
funds to a firm that is just starting to innovate while switching it to the innovative mode, but at 
high risks of failure and loss of funds? We can hardly arrive at somewhat unequivocal answer, 
given the system of rough evaluations available to us, but still the question as such is interesting: 
is state support of innovation in Russia a bonus to the best or a chance to stragglers?  
Let us scrutinize what companies have become recipients (users) of innovation support 
mechanisms, including tax incentives and special purpose funding. Descriptive statistics (Table 5 
of Appendix) witness about a certain shift of innovation state support in favor of big business. 
Regarding company age, there is a bias of tax incentives towards younger firms, whereas 
financial support is oriented at more mature companies.  
Regression analysis (Table 1 of Appendix) has not confirmed our hypothesis about the 
preferential position of big business in obtaining state support. Neither have we found proof of 
the argument that state participation in companies' capital raises their chances to receive support.  
In the recent years, well-off and exporting companies (first of all, those exporting to the 
non-FSU countries) more often became beneficiaries of state support of their innovation. Thus, 
state innovation fostering instruments are more oriented at successfully operating companies 
rather than at 'outsider' firms.  
Companies created in the last five years and, more rarely, enterprises that started 
operation in the Soviet era are significantly more often represented among consumers of 
innovation tax incentives. Apparently, this is a consequence of a wide use by new firms of bonus 
depreciation (a one-time write-off of part of new equipment cost) in their generation and 
development of production base.  
At the same time, we have not found advantageous position of young companies in terms 
of obtaining financial support. It can be argued that this result contradicts the findings of research 
on Spanish firms' behavior, one of which states that young firms often find themselves in the 
situation of harsh financial restrictions and thus prefer to use instruments of direct public 
financing that ensures project pre-financing (Bustom, Corchuelo, Ros, 2012). However, speaking 
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exactly of companies' preferences, this case would be also common for Russia: representatives of 
young Russian companies are more often interested in obtaining direct public financing as part 
of innovation policies (Ivanov, Kuzyk, Simachev, 2012). Preferences and access to the support, 
though, are not the same thing, naturally. Costs of access to financial support mechanisms in 
Russia can be quite high for young firms who do not have developed connections in the system 
of government agencies. 
The use by companies of tax or financial support mechanisms is heavily dependent on the 
change in the competition. Apparently, although both the costs of state support use are significant 
and the instruments themselves are not very friendly to companies, but growing competition 
urges firms to use state innovation fostering instruments.  Thus the use of tax instruments is 
characteristic for companies in the situation of growing competition with new Russian makers, 
while enterprises that face stronger pressure of import more often receive direct public funding. 
The first relation: tax incentives vs. pressure of new Russian companies is probably due to the 
fact that it is precisely new companies who more often than others resort to the use of tax 
incentives, so we can suppose that there is the training effect and competition for the best tax 
regime. As for the financial support vs. import pressure relation, it is likely that it manifests the 
state's propensity to protect national companies from external competition, doing it in various 
ways. Besides, this relation has also to be the consequence of the concepts of the necessity to 
support import substitution and expand domestic demand that are especially popular in Russia.  
 
3.4. Models of building business-state relations: help in exchange for the right behavior? 
We found it logical to suppose that the practice of providing state support to companies 
should be connected with the existing common model of business-state relations. We also 
suggested that the state's being friendly to the support recipients, the justice and transparency 
with which it conducted selection of companies to be granted support were the important 
elements contributing to the motivation of conscientious companies to use state support.  
To characterize the system of business-state interaction
4 
(at the federal level), we have 
determined six conditional models (Table 7 of Appendix), among which first two models are 
                                                          
4   The idea to categorize models of state-business relations emerged owing to our getting 
familiarized with questionnaire of sociologocal survey State of Business Climate in Russia developed by 
VtsIOM (The All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center) agency. In the questionnaire, VtsIOM 
suggests a question: How do you think the authorities treat business, not in their rhetoric but in real life? 
We have tried to avoid excessive negative connotation of the question and associated prompts, added 
some significant, in our opinion, models, and presented an unfolded interpretation of different models in 
cues for a more precise respondent self-identification.  
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partnership ones, two following models imply social and political responsibility, the fifth model 
is oriented only at the state's fiscal interests, and the sixth model suggests non-interventionism by 
the state while maintaining formal enforcement of regulations in the business environment. It is 
precisely the last models that are massively represented in the sample: models defined as 
indifference of the state to business (40% of companies) and as interest in business only as a 
source of income (29%).  
Let us assess correspondences among the models of business-state relations and use 
(receiving) of state support, based on regression analysis (Table 8 of Appendix). First thing to be 
pointed to: the specified models of business-state relations are, as it has turned out, significantly 
related with the use (or, alternatively, non-use) of public support for innovation.  Within 
relationship models in which the state does not attempt to influence business behavior, 
companies are significantly less likely to use any instruments of public support for innovation. 
We cannot, however, assert what in this relationship comes first: is it that state support is more 
targeted at companies responsive to the needs and requests of government representatives, or, 
instead, is it that, after companies have already obtained support, government officials get greater 
opportunity to control their behavior and bargain on some special 'game rules.'  
Second. Positive correlation between the model of political loyalty and availability of 
state support for a company could be regarded as logical, but expression of this relationship 
through the use of tax incentives requires additional scrutiny. Perhaps politically loyal owners 
regard their business sufficiently protected from all kinds of inspections, including tax ones, but 
this is only a supposition.  
Third. However unexpectedly, companies from whom the state expects social 
responsibility seldom become beneficiaries of innovation state support. Another disappointment 
(purely a researchers' one) to be pointed out: due to the selectivity of direct financial support and 
hence inescapable subjectivity of decisions, we supposed initially that companies acting by the 
social responsibility model can more than others count on getting this support. However, we 
obtained the opposite result. Perhaps whenever the state really needs the exchange, in particular 
for companies' social commitments, there are more convenient mechanisms for this purpose 
(rather than those related to fostering innovations), e.g., public procurement or providing support 
via specialized state-controlled banks.  
 
3.5. Impact of state innovation fostering policies on companies' innovative behavior: can 
one choose the better between tax incentives and financial support?  
Mechanisms of innovation state support affect companies' preferences, choice of 
corporate priorities, and determine the set of specific behavioral changes in firms' innovative 
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practices. While discussing the impact of state support on companies' innovative behavior, we 
examined the latter in terms of possible effects, in particular the change in innovative projects' 
parameters (increase in implementation terms and financial scale), changes in the use of 
resources (attracting additional private resources or release of funds for other business areas), 
reduction of innovation risks and ensuring commercialization of R&D operations (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Impact of state policies on companies' innovative behavior (frequency of responses of 
recipient companies' administrators) 
 
Considering descriptive statistics, we can see that, on the one hand, the proportion of 
respondents who reported the absence of any positive impact of state support on company 
innovation is very small: at the level of 10% in the group of companies who received public 
support. On the other, the most common effect of innovation support mechanisms is positive for 
companies but negative concerning the results of public innovation policy, i. e. the release of 
company funds for other development areas. This is nothing else but the effect of replacement of 
private funds with public ones (the „crowding out‟ effect). 
Comparing impact of different innovation support mechanisms, we can see that the 
crowding out effect is significant not only in financial support mechanisms, but also in tax 
incentives. This finding is in tune with results obtained earlier in the study (Lokshin, Mohnen, 
2012), which pointed out significant presence of crowding out effect when tax incentives were 
used. 
Let us proceed to the results of regression analysis (Table 9 of Appendix). First, crowding 
out private funds by the public spending is observed more often in old companies (20 years old 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
Due to public support new promising innovative 
project have been launched
Public support allowed for implementation of more 
valuable projects
Public support allowed for implementation of 
projects with a longer payback period
Public support helped to mitigate risks of 
innovation
Public support helped to attract private financing 
for innovation
Public support helped to commercialize R&D
Public support allowed for redirecting of 
company’s finances to other activities
Public support has had no influence on company’s 
innovation activities
tax incentives grants and subsidies
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or older).  Usually these companies have many diverse pending problems; hence innovation for 
them is far from being the only field to invest in. Furthermore, we can assume that these 
companies have had more frequent chances to use non-innovative ways to ensure their 
competitiveness, in particular by way of lobbying and receiving direct public funding thanks to 
their social importance.   
Interestingly, the effect of state support associated with realization of bigger projects that 
is to some extent inverse to the crowding out effect is typical for partially state-owned 
companies. Perhaps state officials pioneer expansion of innovation in these companies (the 
known and popular logic of forcing public sector companies to innovate), and besides, as noted 
in Russian and foreign studies, representatives of the state, due to information asymmetry, 
usually pay more attention at simple and clear indicators, such as those associated with the 
growth of spending on innovation.    
Second, public funding significantly more often induces initiation of new projects, while 
tax incentives are more helpful in launching projects with longer payback period. This result in 
its first part is analogous to the relationship revealed in (Guellec, Van Pottelsberghe, 2000) study 
on EU countries. It is clear that, in view of the way public support mechanisms are organized, 
usually based on projects' competitive selection under certain conditions, these mechanisms 
often instigate the need to create a new project (or re-format an existing one). But the fact that it 
is tax incentives and not public funding that contribute to companies' realization of longer-term 
projects seemed unexpected and requiring further explanation. We believe that this relationship is 
not due to special aspects of tax incentives but rather reflects the undeveloped state of Russian 
mechanisms of innovation public support, especially regarding the very strict deadlines for 
supported projects (usually no more than three years).  
 
3.6. Costs of companies' access to innovation state support and risks of its use: are 
practitioners always pessimists? 
Performance and efficiency of state support mechanisms significantly depend on their 
main parameters (scale and implementation deadline), terms of access, quality of administration, 
and ensuing risks of use for companies.  In this regard, we shall now look at tax incentives and 
public funding with a focus on the following group of problems: (1) design faults (ambiguous 
regulation, unsuitable parameters, discrimination of some company categories), (2) impaired 
selection procedures (poor information, high bureaucratic costs, unjust winners' determination, 
and corruption), (3) risks and costs of use (additional inspections and complicated enterprise 
accounting). 
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According to descriptive analysis data (Fig. 3), profiles of both tax and fiscal incentives' 
major problems differ significantly: the use of tax mechanisms is clearly stronger limited by 
obscure regulation and deficient support parameters (such as the value of benefits), while public 
funding is more impaired by the complex procedures of obtaining support, overly stringent 
requirements for recipients (applicants), and insufficient justice of selecting the latter.  
 
 
Figure 3. Flaws of tax and financial instruments of innovation state support – frequency of  
responses  
 
To reveal the deterring and underestimated problems of support mechanisms use, we have 
used regression analysis where the main explaining variable was the fact whether a company has 
or has not used a state support mechanism (Table 11 of Appendix). The analysis let us make the 
following clarifications and additions.  
First, our hypothesis that theoreticians are more pessimistic has been partially confirmed.  
For example, the problem that all risks of innovative projects implementation have to be faced by 
an enterprise even when it has state support is regarded as much less important by practitioners, 
no matter if they used tax or fiscal incentives. In addition, representatives of companies that did 
not use financial support were more critical about the vagueness of relevant legislation.   
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
companies have to take all risks of innovative projects
complexity of the procedures for obtaining support
unclear regulations
excessively strict requirements to recipients of support
complication of the corporate accounting and additional 
reporting
unfair selection of recipients
lack of information about the incentives and conditions 
of support
nonoptimal parametrs of support 
increased attention of supervisoty authorities and risk of 
additional audits
the need to have personal relations with officials to 
obtain support
discrimination of small buisnesses 
corruption 
discrimination of new companies 
Tax incentives Public funding
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Second, it would be wrong to argue that practitioners are less concerned about all the 
mentioned problems. On the contrary, they can see even better deficient parameters of tax 
incentives and excessively stern requirements to the structure of allowed spending when using 
public funding. Apparently, practitioners are especially disappointed in limited value of tax 
benefits and inflexible usage of public funding.  
Third, we have found that the difficulties of support mechanisms usage vary significantly 
in groups of young and old enterprises. For example, costs of complicated enterprise accounting 
are more significant for young companies, whether using tax benefits or public funding. 
While representatives of old companies (more than 20 years old) are less critical to the 
parameters of tax instruments, they are also less troubled by the problem of overly stringent 
requirements to potential tax beneficiaries. Therefore, tax incentives better conform by their 
design and terms of access to the needs of old business.  
 
4.  Discussion of obtained results 
1. Our research sample results have not confirmed our initial hypothesis that innovative 
activity is the major factor in labor productivity growth: a half of companies whose productivity 
has increased have had nothing to do with innovation. While innovative enterprises have 
increased their output thanks to investing more in renewal of their production capacities, the 
group of non-innovative enterprises achieved the same result by cutting their staff. We suggest 
that excessive employment has been due to limitations imposed on business during the crisis.  
Labor costs optimization has become possible for companies after the main phase of the crisis 
ended.  
We can suppose that the remaining narrow circle of innovatively active companies in the 
post-crisis period is the consequence of former forced limitations to optimize business.  When 
these limitations were eased, companies received other-than-innovation opportunities to maintain 
their competitiveness – to cut staff in particular. Choosing this path can be also the result of 
personnel low cost and value for innovatively passive and technologically underdeveloped 
companies: they do not need special skills; neither they invest much in human capital 
development.  
 
2. Comparing effects of innovation on supported and not supported companies, we failed 
to discern any visible signs of 'new quality' of state supported innovation. Undeniably, the 
availability of support is likely to be associated with accomplishment of some positive 
innovation results, but we have found significant positive relationship with receiving state 
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support only in increasing export volume and energy efficiency. However, we have noticed no 
impact of state support availability or absence on firms' productivity growth. 
As we can see, the factor of state support alone is rather neutral for company performance 
and especially for the efficiency of its innovation – the quality of company's innovation is much 
more influenced by competitive environment.  Enterprises are driven to expand manufacture of 
new products by growing competition with old Russian firms which, consequently, exhausts 
their potential to improve traditional products.  
 
3. Sufficiently well-off and exporting companies are likely to become beneficiaries of 
innovation state support. Obviously, the latter is oriented at the successful companies and is not 
associated with the help to outsider or, alternatively, insider (partially state-owned) firms. This 
conclusion, however, does not at all exclude distribution of state support to inefficient firms 
outside innovation fostering policy.  
It might seem quite unexpected that state support more often goes to relatively young 
companies, but this is the outcome of the existing structure of support mechanisms. Among 
these, bonus depreciation for investment in new equipment is designed for most massive use; 
what's more, this incentive is more important for startups intensively building their fixed assets.  
Active use of tax benefits is to a large extent a consequence of the training effect and competition 
for the best tax regime with new Russian firms, whereas financial support is more often 
associated with the growing competitive pressure of import. We believe that the latter trend 
reflects the authorities' primal concern to preserve jobs and protect interests of domestic 
producers. These tasks are probably better converted into obtaining financial support from the 
state than anything else in terms of innovation.  
 
4. Companies' use of state support is largely determined by the established model of their 
relationship with the state. If the state does not attempt to control business behavior (e. g., 
demand something from it or restrict it), then the business enjoys significantly less state support 
of its innovation. It could be argued, of course, that the state curbs provision of support to 
companies who do not do its assignments, however, it is rather true, judging by a set of 
attributes, that companies try not to be often put on the spot.  
At the same time, we have found no evidence that business would exchange its social 
responsibility for state support of its innovation. Perhaps, this manifests the desire to increase 
uniformity and transparency of exchanges in state-business relations.  
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5. According to our analysis of how support mechanisms affect companies' innovative 
behavior, the most common effect is the crowding out of private funds by the public spending.   
Moreover, the effect is typical for both public funding and tax incentives mechanisms. We 
believe that the demonstration effect of innovation state support is rather weak. Furthermore, 
innovation is in many cases not a single priority for companies who have had received support, 
and sometimes it rather serves as a mere pretext to receive additional resources.  
  As we compared the influence of tax and financial incentives on companies' innovation 
policy, we found that state financial support brings more results in initiating new projects, 
whereas application of tax policies has positive correlation with longer-term projects. That the 
tax incentives rather than public funding contribute to the realization of longer projects is likely a 
consequence of imperfect design of typical Russian public funding mechanisms, primarily the 
limited time of project support.  
 
6. Efficiency of innovation state support is significantly impaired by deficiencies of 
access and risks of use for companies. Sharing risks with the state has been most frequently 
articulated as most significant problem of state support. This problem has been largely repelling 
for companies who have not used state support of their innovation; furthermore, it hinders the 
growth of competition to receive state support.  
Companies-recipients of innovation support consider the most critical problem of tax 
incentives the inadequate benefits' parameters, whereas major drawbacks of public funding for 
these firms are red tape and complexity of support obtaining procedures. In any case, both the 
tax and fiscal instruments, due to requirements of additional reporting and complicated 
accounting, determine higher costs for young start-up businesses. The fact that the design and 
administration of tax instruments are friendlier to old companies is a natural consequence of that 
interests of an established business are easier to take into account, it looks more significant to the 
authorities, and its representatives have better opportunities to influence development and 
amendment of support mechanisms.  
 
In conclusion, we would like to put forward the following theses for further study and 
discussion: 
(1) presumably, the innovation support system in Russia is oriented at a mature national 
innovation system, yet the majority of Russian companies demand support of relatively simple 
innovation pertaining to imitation, acquisition, and adaptation of existing technologies and 
upgrade of production facilities;  
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(2) innovation may be influenced stronger by improvements in institutional environment, 
especially development of competition, besides, attempts to amend innovation policy apart from 
the issues of industrial sectors' organization development can significantly impair possible 
results;  
(3) the choice of an 'ideal' innovation support mechanism is hardly possible: both tax and 
fiscal mechanisms have their own sets of pros and cons, nevertheless, it is important to actively 
engage new and young business in support instruments amending discussion; 
(4) efficiency of innovation support mechanisms cannot be evaluated only in the short-term 
dimension and only in the aspect of volume indicators – it is important to monitor change in 
companies' behavior, though the latter is quite sensitive to the transparency and predictability of 
support terms and real distribution of risks. 
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Appendix 
 
Table I. Structure of sample 
 
Percentage of companies, % 
in the sample 
of 2012 
in the panel 
(2011-2012) 
  
Age of company   
less than 5 years  10,7 7,7 
5-10 years  18,3 18,3 
10-20 years  25,3 26,5 
over 20 years  45,7 47,5 
Industry   
extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas  6,7 6,3 
manufacture of food products, including beverages  15,6 17,3 
manufacture of textiles and textile products  13,8 13,5 
manufacture of wood, wood products, pulp, paper and paper 
products  11,3 12,5 
manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  10,3 10,4 
manufacture of rubber and plastic products  6,7 6,8 
manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  6,7 - 
manufacture of basic metals  7,5 7,5 
manufacture of machinery and equipment  8,0 9,3 
manufacture of electrical machinery and equipment  6,1 8,0 
manufacture of transport equipment  7,1 8,4 
Number of employees   
up to 250 employees 22,1 18,1 
251-500 employees 27,8 30,1 
501-1000 employees 18,5 19,8 
over 1,000 employees 15,8 17,6 
up to 250 employees 15,8 14,4 
Annual revenue   
not more than 100 million roubles  20,9 14,3 
more than 100 million roubles, but not more than 500 million 
roubles  25,2 28,3 
more than 500 million roubles, no more than 1 billion roubles  19,0 21,0 
more than 1 billion roubles, but not more than 5 billion roubles  24,5 27,5 
more than 5 billion roubles  10,1 9,0 
Ownership   
participation of foreign owners  18,9 21,9 
participation of foreign owners more than 10% 13,8 9,2 
participation of government and / or municipalities  10,7 9,6 
Exporting   
to the former Soviet Union (FSU) countries  48,2 54,0 
to other countries  28,2 33,9 
Financial condition   
poor  11,0 9,4 
satisfactory  65,2 64,9 
good  23,3 25,7 
N 652 415 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  26 
 
Table II. Interrelation between productivity growth and innovation activity (on panel 
sample) 
 
Subgroups Firms that achieved 
productivity growth 
Panel sample 
Non-innovative firms 
 
44,7% 
 
41,6% 
 
1.1 which have not innovated ever in the past 41,3% 35,8% 
1.2 which ceased innovating in last 3 years 3,4% 5,8% 
Innovative firms 
 
55,3% 
 
58,4% 
 
2.1 which have innovated earlier  
16,2% 
42,1% 
2.2 which began to innovate in last 3 years 39,1% 16,3% 
TOTAL: 100,0% 100,0% 
N 179 413 
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Table III. Labor productivity growth of companies – results of binary logistic regression 
parameters estimation 
 
Productivity growth of non-
innovative companies 
Productivity growth of 
innovative companies 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Age of company 
less than 5 years     
over 20 years     
Number of 
employees 
up to 100  -0,634* 0,721* -0,871*  
101-250  1,394** 0,842* 1,211*** 1,054** 
501-1000      
over 1000    -1,882*** -1,218** 
downsizing  0,970**   
Ownership 
participation of 
government     
no foreign owners   -0,622*   
Technological level 
high     
low 1,096*    
Financial condition good -0,905* -1,113*   
poor     
Competition with 
Russian firms 
no      
tough     
lessening     
intensification    -0,897* 
Competition with 
foreign firms 
no      
tough     
lessening    1,506** 
intensification    -0,136 
Revenue 
under $15 million      
over $200 million     
increase  0,739*  2,230*** 
Fixed capital 
expenditure 
under 1% -0,892* -0,975*   
over 5%     
increase    0,965** 
TPP innovation 
expenditures 
under 1%     
over 5%     
increase     
Industry dummies yes 
Constant 2,971 23,777 4,937 -0,389 
N 415 415 415 415 
R2  (Nagelkerke) 0,21 0,28 0,23 0,32 
 
Hereinafter: 
*      significant at 0,01 level 
**    significant at 0,05 level 
*** significant at 0,01 level 
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Table IV Performance indicators increased due to innovations – results of binary logistic 
regression parameters estimation (for innovative companies subsample) 
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Receiving state support in last 3 years   1,108**    ,631*  -1,854* 
Age of company 
less than 5 
years 
      1,360** 1,663**  
over 20 years      -1,107*** ,855** 1,442***  
Number of 
employees 
up to 100   ,832**        
101-250   ,861**    -1,179**    
501-1000  ,968*** 1,391***        
over 1000   ,756*   1,016*** 1,215** 1,034*   
Ownership 
participation 
of government 
   -,823*      
no foreign 
owners  
        
 
over 10% of 
foreign 
owners 
         
 
Financial condition 
poor -,859*     ,989*   3,076*** 
good          
Worker efficiency 
low -,882***   ,649** ,577**     
high    ,561*   1,091**  -2,135* 
Competition with 
Russian firms 
no           
tough    -,593*      
Competition with 
foreign firms 
no  -,779**         
tough -,677**         
Intensification of 
competition  
with old 
Russian firms 
 1,097***     ,952**   
with new 
Russian firms 
     -,873*    
with Russian 
divisions of 
MNC 
  -2,628**       
with import        1,636***  
Export 
no   -3,090***       
to far abroad 
countries 
       1,051*  
Industry dummies yes 
Constant ,295 -1,133 -,147 -1,444* -1,649** -2,241** -5,359*** -4,822*** -7,097*** 
N  391  391  391  391  391  391  391  391  391 
R2  (Nagelkerke) 
,178 ,191 ,363 ,150 ,166 ,238 ,243 ,341 ,520 
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Table V.  State support for innovation regarding company's size, age, financial condition and innovation 
activity   
  
Companies that 
have obtained 
public support 
incl. ones that in last 3 years 
have used tax 
incentives  
have received 
public funding 
Total 
 
24,2% 17,5% 8,6% 
Number of employees       
up to 100 employees 18,1% 11,8% 4,9% 
101-250 employees 13,8% 8,3% 5,0% 
251-500 employees 29,8% 22,3% 9,1% 
501-1000 employees 31,1% 27,2% 6,8% 
over 1000 employees 37,9% 26,2% 21,4% 
Age of company    
less than 5 years 30,0% 24,3% 5,7% 
5- 10 years 26,9% 22,7% 6,7% 
10-20 years 21,8% 17,6% 7,9% 
over 20 years 23,2% 13,8% 10,4% 
Financial conditions    
poor 2,8% 2,8% 0,0% 
satisfactory 22,8% 14,8% 7,3% 
good 38,2% 31,6% 16,4% 
Innovations in last 3 years    
non-innovative 3,5% 3,1% 0,0% 
innovative 37,9% 27,0% 14,2% 
incl.     
ones that have started innovating recently 27,3% 21,2% 10,1% 
pnes that are continious innovators  42,5% 28,7% 16,5% 
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Table VI.  Obtaining of state support for innovation in last 3 years – results of binary logistic regression 
parameters estimation (for innovative companies subsample) 
 
    
Obtaining of 
public support 
Use of tax 
incentives 
Obtaining of public 
funding 
Age of company 
less than 5 years 1,076** ,986*  
over 20 years  -,853**  
Number of employees 
up to 100     
101-250     
501-1000     
over 1000     
Ownership 
participation of 
government 
   
no foreign owners     
over 10% of foreign 
owners 
   
Financial condition 
poor -2,316** -1,341**  
good ,511* ,771* 1,049* 
Worker efficiency 
low    
high    
Competition with Russian firms 
no     
tough    
Competition with foreign firms 
no   ,726*  
tough    
Intensification of competition  
with old Russian firms    
with new Russian firms ,629* 1,117***  
with Russian divisions 
of MNC 
  -1,174** 
with import ,707*  ,806* 
Export 
no -1,006*** -1,610***  
to far abroad countries ,691*  ,982* 
Industry dummies 
yes 
Constant  -,039 -3,478*** 
N   391  391 
R2  (Nagelkerke)  ,389 ,229 
 
  
  31 
 
 
 
Table  VII. Models of the business-state interaction at the federal level   
Модели отношений  
D
ir
ec
t 
st
a
te
 
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
  
P
ri
o
ri
ty
 o
f 
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
s 
P
er
ca
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
co
m
p
a
n
ie
s 
1. State considers business as an equal partner; attracting investments 
and improvement of business conditions are authorities‟ main priorities  
No Business 
9% 
 
2. State does not hamper the development of business but considers it as 
a junior partner and aims to hold the keys of corporate actions 
Yes 
Business and 
Government 
16% 
 
3. State focuses on companies‟ social responsibility but does not 
intervene in any other matters 
Yes 
Government 
and Society 
14% 
 
4. Authorities main concern is entrepreneurship political loyalty  
Yes Government 
6% 
 
5. Business is considered as a sourse of income only 
No Government 
29% 
 
6. Government non-interference with business except for law 
enforcement  
No - 
40% 
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Table  VIII. Obtaining of public support regarding model of business-state interaction – results of binary 
logistic regression parameters estimation  
 
    
Obtainung 
of public 
support   
Use of tax 
incentives 
Obtaining of 
public funding  
Models of the business-state 
interaction 
partners    
strategic control    
social responsibility -0,766*  -1,087* 
political loyalty 1,213** 0,970**  
source of income -1,362***  -1,208** 
noninterference -1,879*** -1,258*** -1,618*** 
Control dummies  See Table IV* 
Constant   -1,655** 
N    
R2  (Nagelkerke)    
 
 *) While processing binary logistic regression parameters estimation, the following variables were 
controlled: industry, age, size, ownership, financial condition, productivity level, competition and its dynamics,  
and exports. 
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Table  IX. Changes in companies‟ innovation activities due to public support  – results of binary logistic 
regression parameters estimation (on subsample of companies, which have received public support in last 3 years) 
 
    
N
ew
 
p
ro
m
is
in
g
 
in
n
o
v
at
iv
e 
p
ro
je
ct
 h
as
 
b
ee
n
 
la
u
n
ch
ed
 
Im
p
le
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
m
o
re
 
v
al
u
ab
le
 
p
ro
je
ct
s 
Im
p
le
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
p
ro
je
ct
s 
w
it
h
 l
o
n
g
er
 
p
ay
b
ac
k
 
p
er
io
d
 
D
ec
re
as
e 
in
 
ri
sk
s 
o
f 
in
n
o
v
at
io
n
 
R
ed
ir
ec
ti
n
g
 
o
f 
co
m
p
an
y
‟s
 
fi
n
an
ce
s 
to
 
o
th
er
 
ac
ti
v
it
ie
s 
Use of tax incentives in last 3 years   1,522*   
Obtaining of public funding in last 3years 1,891**     
Age of company 
less than 5 years      
over 20 years     1,293** 
Number of 
employees 
up to 100     2,380*  
101-250    -2,321*   
501-1000      1,443* 
over 1000   -2,073*  -3,661**  
Ownership 
participation of 
government 
 4,378**  3,164*  
no foreign owners  2,475**     
over 10% of foreign 
owners 
     
Financial 
condition 
poor   -1,394*  -1,510*** 
good      
Worker efficiency 
low  2,025*    
high   -2,500**   
Competition with 
Russian firms 
no     -4,088**  
tough      
Competition with 
foreign firms 
Intensification of 
competition  
no       
tough      
with old Russian firms   2,762** 2,271*  
with new Russian firms     ,982* 
Industry, financial condition and exports 
dummies 
yes 
Constant -6,390*** ,136 -2,599 -4,182* -2,264 
N  156  156  156  156  156 
R2  (Nagelkerke) ,338  ,388 ,433 ,526 ,340 
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Table X. Disadvantages of tax incentives and public funding 
 
 
Disadvantages of tax incentives Disadvantages of public funding 
Companies that 
have NOT used 
tax incentives 
Companies that 
have received 
public funding 
Companies that 
have NOT 
received public 
funding 
Companies that 
have received 
public funding 
Complexity of procedures for obtaining 
support 14,9% 7,0% 25,0% 39,3% 
Excessively strict requirements to recipients 
of support 8,4% 7,0% 12,8% 28,6% 
Complication if the corporate accounting 
and additional reporting 13,0% 7,0% 13,6% 17,9% 
Unfair selection of recipients 5,2% 1,8% 13,1% 16,1% 
Nonoptimal parameters of support (value of 
tax benefits, timing and amount of financing, 
etc.) 11,5% 37,7% 8,7% 10,7% 
Companies have to take all risks of 
innovative projects 29,6% 12,3% 30,2% 8,9% 
Lack of information about the incentitives 
and conditions of the support 8,9% 3,5% 10,2% 8,9% 
Increased attention of supervisory authorities 
and risk of additional audits 11,2% 8,8% 8,2% 8,9% 
Unclear regulations 21,7% 24,6% 16,4% 5,4% 
Corruption of officials 4,5% 3,5% 6,0% 3,6% 
The need to have personal relation with 
officials to obtain support 5,2% 2,6% 8,6% 1,8% 
Discrimination of small businesses in getting 
support 4,1% 2,6% 6,4% 1,8% 
Discrimination of new companies in getting 
support 1,9% 0,9% 1,5% 0,0% 
N 538 114 596 56 
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Table XI. Disadvantages and problems of (А) tax incentives; (В) public funding – results of 
binary logistic regression parameters estimation 
  
U
n
cl
ea
r 
re
g
u
la
ti
o
n
s 
N
o
n
o
p
ti
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al
 p
ar
am
et
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s 
o
f 
su
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rt
 
E
x
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y
 s
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t 
re
q
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 t
o
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 o
f 
su
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C
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f 
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u
re
s 
fo
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o
b
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U
n
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L
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 c
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ra
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o
m
p
an
ie
s 
h
av
e 
to
 t
ak
e 
al
l 
ri
sk
s 
o
f 
in
n
o
v
at
iv
e 
p
ro
je
ct
s 
Use of tax incentives in last 3 years  1,378***    -1,001*  -0,730** 
Age of company 
up to 5 years       1,620*** 0,597* 
over 20 years  -0,937*** -0,855**      
Control dummies See Table IV* 
Constant -2,05*** 0,367 -0,406 -0,470 -3,030*** -1,576 -3,878*** -2,441*** 
N 647 647 647 647 647 647 647 647 
R2  (Nagelkerke) ,102 ,268 ,169 ,112 ,124 ,106 ,160 ,189 
 
 
 
Obtaining of public funding in last 3 years  -1,247*  0,906**     -1,269** 
Age of company 
up to 5 years       1,929***  
over 20 years    0,424*     
Control dummies See Table IV* 
Constant -2,379** -1,094 -1,028 -0,989 -3,362** -1,381 -3,564*** -2,943*** 
N 647 647 647 647 647 647 647 647 
R2  (Nagelkerke) ,164 ,113 ,169 ,181 ,182 ,116 ,295 ,198 
 
 
 *) While processing binary logistic regression parameters estimation, the following variables 
were controlled: industry, size, ownership, financial condition, productivity level, competition and its 
dynamics,  exports, and changes in innovation activity within last 3 years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
